The expanding scope of risks: From maritime routes to investments and infrastructure
LONDON - The Persian Gulf states face the prospect of wider escalation. The potential risks are not confined to Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. They may extend to other Persian Gulf states whose economies are closely tied to international investment, energy, trade, technology and financial services. Some of these countries, including Kuwait and the UAE, could face pressures affecting major economic and strategic interests if the confrontation widens and escalation continues.
In the scenarios being considered, this could include targeting American interests and companies operating in the region, including information technology and artificial intelligence companies, oil companies, and industries associated with petroleum derivatives and fertilizers. The danger of these possibilities lies in the fact that Persian Gulf economies depend on a stable business environment, the movement of trade, the continued flow of energy and investor confidence.
Consequently, an expansion in the scope of potential targeting could result in damage extending beyond direct losses, affecting investment, insurance, shipping and supply chains. As for the suggestion that such developments could lead to the collapse of Persian Gulf states or the complete depletion of their investments, this remains an extremely serious scenario rather than an inevitable outcome. Its consequences would depend on the scale and duration of the escalation, as well as the ability of these states to protect their economic infrastructure and adapt to shocks. This is particularly if the United States is defeated and abandons them.
The extension of the confrontation to targeting American economic interests opens up a new dimension of the conflict. This is because targeting commercial assets or companies linked to the United States could impose costs on Washington that extend beyond its military establishment. Companies operating in advanced technology, artificial intelligence and energy represent part of America's economic and strategic interests abroad.
Their presence in the region is also dependent on the availability of protection and stability, as well as the ability to conduct business under normal conditions. If the scope of security risks expands, insurance and operating costs could rise, investment appetite could decline, and host governments could face increasing pressure to provide additional protection. This highlights one of the potential strategic options: expanding the pressure from military assets to the economic interests underpinning the American presence and its network of relationships in the region.
One of the more dangerous scenarios is the possibility that escalation could extend to submarine cables passing through strategic maritime corridors. These cables play an essential role in transmitting data and communications between countries, particularly the Persian Gulf states, where the scale of investment exceeds $200 billion, and between continents. Digital infrastructure has become an integral part of countries' economic and strategic security.
Communications are no longer simply a civilian service separate from military conflicts. Any widespread disruption to submarine cables could affect internet services, international communications, the financial and business sectors, and digital services. However, the nature of the damage would depend on the location and scale of the disruption and the availability of alternative routes.
Including digital infrastructure in the assessment of potential risks illustrates just how far the scope of a possible confrontation could extend. Maritime routes do not carry oil and goods alone; they also carry a fundamental part of the infrastructure on which modern economic life depends. The scenarios under consideration also include the possibility of targeting American naval military assets, which form an essential part of the United States' ability to project power overseas.
These assets play a role in demonstrating American military strength, deterring enemies and reassuring allies. The American naval presence is not based solely on its combat function. It is also connected to the image the United States seeks to project: that of a power capable of protecting shipping lanes, international interests, its network of military bases and its overseas military deployments.
Consequently, if these assets were subjected to severe or even partial destruction, or came under significant pressure, this would affect America's deterrence posture and the level of confidence its allies place in its ability to protect them. Furthermore, some allies' sense of security rests on the assumption that American protection will remain available and effective, regardless of how far the confrontation expands. This assumption could be put to the test if the cost of protecting American interests and deployments abroad exceeds Washington's capacity or willingness to bear it.
Alongside economic and maritime pressure, there is the possibility of extending the confrontation into the land domain, as another strategic option that could emerge if other forms of pressure fail to impose a settlement. Raising this possibility does not mean that a decision has been made or that its implementation is necessarily likely. Rather, it forms part of the range of scenarios that must be considered when analyzing the course of the war.
A ground offensive differs from air and missile strikes in terms of the forces required, logistical support, the ability to hold territory and the capacity to sustain casualties. It could also open up new avenues of attrition and make the escalation increasingly difficult to control. The central point is that the range of options available to the parties, together with the varying costs imposed by each option, makes the calculations of war far more complex than simply comparing the size of military arsenals.
Just as the United States sometimes welcomes the idea of occupying certain islands and takes steps in that direction, the opposing side also has options that could place countries within the American camp under pressure. Some of these countries fear the possibility of their own territories being partitioned, while their regimes fear collapse, particularly amid regional confrontations that are not developing in their favor.
Saudi Arabia, for example, illustrates this situation through its war with Yemen, its efforts to summon defensive alliances and its calls for the deployment of Egyptian forces. Syria, too, forms part of this wider picture, with developments there potentially threatening to push the entire region towards an explosion and raising the possibility of changes to existing borders. This is the nature of major wars: they produce far-reaching consequences, and among their repercussions are major geopolitical transformations, including changes to the map itself.
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